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Much contemporary research on anomalous experiences has been focused on issues of confirming the 
authenticity of the phenomena, or to determine the underlying processes by which these phenomena may 
manifest themselves. This research has largely been nomothetic in nature relying mainly on laboratory 
experiments and/or questionnaire surveys. Yet, traditionally, there exists a third strand of exploration in this 
field of study–phenomenological research–which in recent times has been somewhat overlooked in this field of 
work. In an attempt to redress this shortcoming, the authors propose the use of Interpretative Phenomenological 
Analysis (IPA) to research anomalous experience. IPA possesses strong theoretical and philosophical 
underpinnings and a focus on describing and interpreting the process, intricacy and novelty of personal 
experience. The authors argue therefore that IPA appears ideally suited as a method of qualitative investigation 
to address important fundamental research questions posed by the study of anomalous experiences. By 
examining in-depth the experience and meaning of these critical life events, IPA research findings can better 
furnish psychologists and health care professionals with information to further appreciate and understand their 
clients’ experiences and to help them with any potential personality transformations or psycho-spiritual crises 
that may arise after the event. 
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What Are ‘Anomalous Experiences’? 
Paranormal phenomena have long been a source of interest and debate for society as well as 
areas of research interest in psychology (Cardeña, Lynn, & Krippner, 2000; Inglis, 1992; 
Wooffitt, 1992). As with many topics in psychology, defining an area of interest can prove 
problematic. Conceptually, there exists several terms that describe the study of paranormal 
phenomena (e.g. parapsychology, psi or psychical research), each purporting to embrace a 
slightly different range of topics and approaches within their spheres of study.1  
More recently the term ‘anomalous experience’ has become increasingly used among 
researchers interested in the study of the paranormal. Anomalous experiences have been 
defined by Cardeña et al (2000, p. 4) as “uncommon experience[s]...[or encounters] that, 
although…experienced by a substantial amount of the population…[are] assumed to deviate 
from ordinary experiences or from the usually accepted explanations of reality”. From this 
definition, anomalous experiences can be conceived of more broadly as encompassing topics 
such as extra-sensory perception (ESP), psychokinesis (PK), out-of-body and near-death 
experiences, altered states of consciousness, hypnosis, religious, mystical or spiritual 
experiences, alien abduction experiences (AAEs), dissociative phenomena, and hypnagogic 
and hypnopompic hallucinations. This list is by no means definitive and the true range of 
anomalous experiences is difficult to classify given their diversity (Castro, 2005). 
In this paper, we prefer to use the term ‘anomalous experience’2 rather than ‘paranormal’ 
or ‘parapsychological’ due to its overall inclusiveness of a broader range of phenomena 
conducive to psychological inquiry. We feel this is important as, given the differences in 
scope, nature and focus of investigation suggested by the terms above, it is probable that the 
conceptions of what constitutes a ‘paranormal’ happening will vary between experients and 
non-experients and even between different professionals. Moreover, the word ‘experience’ 
draws into focus the personal nature of these occurrences. That an out-of-body experience 
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does occur is without doubt. Whether or not the event is a literal separation of something 
from the physical body or an elaborate hallucination is a matter for further investigation. The 
way in which an experient will interpret and draw meaning from the event will be dependent, 
in part, upon if that person believes they have left their body or not. What then may be of 
great concern to the experient (and researcher) is the ‘emergence’ of the experience into their 
consciousness. How did the phenomenon initially present itself? What did it feel like? Irwin 
and Watt (2007a) suggest this concern with perceptions is fundamental in the scientific 
investigation of anomalous experiences, and is reflected in their definition of parapsychology 
as, “the study of experiences having the appearance of being in principle outside the realm of 
human capabilities as conceived by conventional scientists” (p.3). 
Taking the above points–experience, belief, appearance–into consideration, in the 
remainder of this paper we will argue that the study of anomalous experiences would be 
further enhanced if researched using a qualitative, idiographic approach such as Interpretative 
Phenomenological Analysis (IPA). IPA is concerned with the investigation of lived 
experience. It views experience, not solely as a possession of a person, but more as a 
correlational relationship between the person’s consciousness and the phenomenon itself 
(Langdridge, 2007). Phenomenologically speaking, Husserl (1931) termed this 
‘intentionality’; the correlation between that which is being experienced (the noema or 
noematic correlate) and how it is being experienced (noesis or the noetic correlate).  
In taking this view, IPA then assumes that a person’s experiences can be accessed and 
understood through an exploration of the meanings they apportion to those experiences. In 
the following sections we will focus on describing what IPA is, how it fits into the pantheon 
of current qualitative approaches and what makes IPA particularly suitable for the study of 
anomalous experiences. We will illustrate our arguments with empirical examples of how we 
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have used IPA to explore the lived experiences of people who have had out-of-body and 
near-death experiences.  
 
Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis and its Relevance to the Study of Anomalous 
Experiences 
Much of the contemporary research conducted on anomalous experiences has been 
focused on issues concerning either the veridicality of the phenomena, or to determine more 
precisely the underlying processes by which these phenomena may manifest themselves. This 
research agenda has produced a wealth of creditable studies of a mostly nomothetic nature 
using laboratory experiments (e.g. Bem & Honorton, 1994) and/or questionnaire surveys (e.g. 
Kennedy & Kanthamani, 1995).  
Yet, historically and traditionally, there exists a third strand of exploration in this field of 
study–phenomenological research–which in recent times has been somewhat overlooked, one 
might say, to the detriment of understanding the psychological life of the person having such 
experiences (Irwin & Watt, 2007a). There are, of course, several notable examples of this 
kind of work, for instance, Hanson and Klimo’s (1998) study of synchronicity,3 Barrett’s 
(1996) work on channeling,4 Heath’s (1999; 2000) examination of PK experiences, the 
research conducted on ESP experiences by Reed (1995; 1996), and the phenomenological 
work of Valle (e.g. , 1998). However, it remains the case that compared to the scale and 
variety of the field of study, phenomenologically-based research is still a neglected approach 
in this area. In an attempt to redress this shortcoming, we discuss Interpretative 
Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) here as a relatively new qualitative method for 
investigating anomalous experiences. IPA differs in relation to other phenomenological 
approaches used in this field of study in that it takes its influence from the broader body of 
phenomenology, rather than endorsing one specific form of it (Smith, Flowers & Larkin, 
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2009) (although, in practice, most IPA researchers have favoured a Heideggerian existential-
hermeneutic approach in their work). Moreover, whilst most phenomenological methods are 
purely descriptive in their approach, IPA is delineated by its interpretative element. IPA also 
embraces the idiographic traditions of examining convergence and divergence across cases, 
unlike some phenomenological traditions which seek to build up common accounts of 
people’s experiences with the aim of describing a generalized structure of the phenomenon 
under scrutiny (Langdridge, 2007). 
Theoretically and philosophically, IPA is founded on a blend of three main philosophies of 
knowledge: phenomenology, hermeneutics and idiography (Smith, Flowers, & Larkin, 2009).  
IPA is principally phenomenological in that it seeks to obtain and honor a person’s 
experiences, understandings, perceptions and accounts (Reid, Flowers, & Larkin, 2005). 
There is no attempt to construct an objective ‘truth’ about an experience, but there is an 
appreciation that experiences are ‘meaning-full’ for a person. For this reason IPA is more 
concerned with the subjective account and meaning of an experience (Brocki & Wearden, 
2006).   
However, IPA also acknowledges that in order to reach a deeper understanding of 
ourselves and our world, it is important to consider how a person interprets their world, both 
individually and socially. In attempting to gain access to another person’s world IPA 
recognizes that “access depends on and is complicated by the researcher’s own 
conceptions...required in order to make sense of that other personal world through a process 
of interpretative activity” (Smith, Jarman, & Osborn, 1999, pp. 218-219). IPA then positions 
itself ‘centre-ground’ between purely realist and social constructionist approaches (Smith, 
Flowers, & Larkin, 2009). It aims to achieve this position by balancing both the hermeneutics 
of empathy and critique by attempting to view a participant’s experience through their eyes–
the ‘insider’s perspective (Conrad, 1987)–while concurrently trying to maintain a critical 
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distance. This critical perspective, however, is not one of suspicion, rather it emphasizes the 
role of the researcher as an active player in the interpretation process, what Smith (1996) 
refers to as the ‘double hermeneutic’. Smith conceptualizes the double hermeneutic as thus; a 
single hermeneutic refers to a participant trying to make sense of their lifeworld, the double 
hermeneutic involves the researcher trying to make sense of the participant trying to make 
sense of their lifeworld. From this perspective, IPA is then both descriptive and interpretative 
as it holds that no phenomenon can be perceived without some form of interpretation taking 
place. 
IPA takes an idiographic approach to the study of the human condition in that its focus is 
chiefly concerned with the painstaking, detailed analysis of specific cases. Human experience 
is viewed as “uniquely embodied, situated and perspectival” (Smith, Flowers, & Larkin, 
2009, p. 29) while at the same time acknowledging that people are rooted in the real world, 
and as such are relational to things, events and others. 
Where IPA has perhaps taken its most controversial direction is in its concern with the 
cognitions of the person. Willig (2001) and Langdridge (2007) have been critical of this 
concern, viewing it as incompatible with the fundamentals of phenomenology; in particular 
phenomenology’s rejection of Cartesian dualism. However, the interest IPA has with 
cognition is based on a broader conception than is perhaps currently held by contemporary 
cognitive psychology. In attempting to clarify this issue, Smith, Flowers and Larkin (2009) 
have expanded their vision of the phenomenological ‘natural attitude’ to incorporate “both 
pre-reflective and reflective activity” (p. 188). They suggest that, rather than being a 
dichotomous activity, reflective activity is carried out on multiple layers, from ‘pre-reflective 
reflexivity’ to ‘deliberately controlled reflection’, with each layer characterized by an 
enhanced degree of awareness (see Smith, Flowers, & Larkin, ibid, pp187-194, for a more 
complete account). In carrying out IPA, therefore, the researcher is confronted with the task 
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of disentangling a ‘chain of connection’ between what a person might be thinking 
(cognizing), what they are saying about those thoughts (narrative account) and what they are 
doing about it (behaviour). In this sense IPA has aligned itself with Bruner’s (1990) original 
“vision of cognitive psychology as a science of meaning and meaning-making rather than a 
science of information processing” (Smith & Eatough, 2006, p. 325). 
Given what we have outlined above, we would like to close this section by emphasizing 
why we think IPA would be suitable to use as a method of qualitative investigation for the 
study of anomalous experiences.  
Smith and Osborn (2003, p. 53) have described IPA as “especially useful when one is 
concerned with complexity, process or novelty”. This would seem to fit well with the three 
central concerns of anomalistic experiential research–authenticity, underlying process and 
phenomenology (Braud, 2004; Irwin & Watt, 2007a). For example, IPA can help address 
experiential research questions, such as, what is the lived experience of having synesthesia? 
Or indeed, further light may be shed on more process-oriented matters, such as, what do 
participants say facilitates or inhibits the control of their out-of-body experiences? 
Conceptual inquiries may also be considered, such as, how is the metaphor of ‘the path’ used 
by those seeking spiritual growth and development? Allied to conceptualization is theorizing 
about the findings of research. Questioning an experience from a theoretical perspective may 
help with the generation of future research hypotheses or aid in exposing underlying 
processes. Although principally an idiographic method of inquiry, IPA also recognizes the 
importance of theory. IPA researchers have addressed the issue of when and where to draw 
upon theory in the research process without contravening the inductive nature and spirit of 
the method in several ways (Storey, 2007). The first involves bringing theory into play during 
the post-hoc stages of analysis, once the majority of the preliminary descriptive coding has 
been completed and more conceptual and linguistic coding is underway. This retains the 
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focus on what the participant is saying in their own words about their experiences, without 
imposing any particular theory onto the data (e.g. Flowers, Smith, Sheeran, & Beail, 1997). 
Vignoles, Chryssochoou and Breakwell (2004) have adopted a slightly different approach this 
by choosing in advance which theoretical models they wished to use to interpret the data. 
Chin, Hayward, & Drinnan (2009) varied this approach again by specifying one theoretical 
framework prior to analysis and using that to inform the analysis, rather than employing it in 
a theory testing fashion.  
One criticism that has been leveled at research into anomalous experiences is that studies 
be as robust as possible to potential biases brought about by the beliefs of the researchers 
themselves (Druckman & Swets, 1988) (but see also a rejoinder to this by Palmer, Honorton, 
& Utts, 1988). Irwin and Watt (2007a) have discussed this issue, noting that the subject 
matter itself “tends to evoke extreme reactions in people, either of uncritical, soft-minded 
gullibility in the paranormal or of unyielding, closed-minded skepticism” (p. 2). Drawing 
upon its phenomenological roots, IPA encourages its practitioners to suspend their pre-
existing assumptions, beliefs and knowledge towards the experience under consideration 
(often called ‘bracketing’). In so doing, the researcher takes a reflexive turn in which they 
bring in to focus their own presumptions and biases and then put these to ones side in order to 
view the phenomenon from a fresh perspective (Langdridge, 2007). Although, in practice, 
most researchers will acknowledge that this is very difficult to do.  
Anomalous experiences are often novel events that are a defining part of the experient’s 
life, and as such the experient will cognize about them, talk about them and their behaviour 
can be affected permanently afterwards. Fittingly, the personal biographical framework in 
which IPA works, which is not traditionally a concern of phenomenology, as well as its 
cognitive focus, is ideally suited to investigate the social, psychological, affective and 
temporal factors that may dominate a person’s experiential world prior to, during and beyond 
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their encounter with events they may perceive as ‘uncommon’. Furthermore, several authors 
(e.g. Braud, 1993, 2004; Brown & White, 1997; White, 1997) have called for more research 
on the significance and impact anomalous experiences have on those who have them. This 
research can be carried out independently of whether or not the anomalous experience in 
question has exhibited externally corroborated veridical elements (Braud, 2004; Irwin & 
Watt, 2007a). Being qualitative in nature, and thereby being able to produce detailed, 
substantially descriptive and interpretative accounts of anomalous experience, IPA gives the 
anomalistic psychological researcher a unique approach for understanding how experients 
find meaning in and make sense of their experiences. 
 
Examples of Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis as Applied to the Study of Out-
of-Body and Near-Death Experiences 
In this section, we will illustrate some of the features of IPA that we have discussed above 
with a selection of our recent empirical work conducted on the topic of out-of-body and near-
death experiences. Before we do that, we must first define what these two anomalous 
phenomena are.  
The out-of-body experience (OBE) has been defined by Irwin and Watt (2007b, p. 173) as 
a phenomenon whereby “the centre of consciousness appears to the experient to occupy 
temporarily a position which is spatially remote from his/her body” and has been a research 
topic for psychologists for over 100 years (Alvarado, 1992). Phenomenologically, the OBE is 
characterized by a multiplicity of features, but those most commonly reported in the literature 
are: a floating sensation, seeing the physical body from a remote point in space, and the 
impression of travelling to distant locations (Alvarado, 2000). OBEs have been reported to 
occur under a variety of different circumstances, such as; happening spontaneously 
(Blackmore, 1986); during periods of illness or stress (Palmer, 1978); via voluntary 
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induction, following techniques suggested by Monroe (1971) for example; under hypnosis 
(Cardeña, 1988); whilst under the influence of alcohol or drugs (Tart, 1971); whilst 
meditating (Kohr, 1980), and as part of a near-death experience (Ring, 1980).  
The majority of previous research on OBEs has aimed to ‘profile’ people who have OBEs; 
in order to describe their personality, or to predict what kind of personality would be most 
likely to have an OBE. Such studies have found that people who have had out-of body 
experiences (OBErs) score higher on measures of dissociation, especially somatoform 
dissociation (Irwin, 2000, Murray & Fox, 2005), fantasy proneness (Gow et al., 2004), 
paranormal belief (Tobacyk & Mitchell, 1987), and display a propensity to become more 
psychologically absorbed (Myers, Austrin, Grisso & Nickeson, 1983) than non-OBErs. 
The near-death experience (NDE) has been defined by Greyson (1994, p. 460) as “a 
profound subjective event with transcendental or mystical elements that many people 
experience on the threshold of death”. Although reports of NDEs have appeared throughout 
recorded human history (e.g. Walker & Serdahely, 1990), they were first brought popular and 
increased academic attention in the mid-1970’s with the publication of Raymond Moody’s 
(1975) book, ‘Life after Life’.  
The majority of studies conducted on NDEs have profiled the experient as a healthy, well-
adjusted individual (Greyson, 2000), and delineated the occurrence of the NDE as one free 
from demographic differentiation (Ring, 1980) and as a mostly a positive, life-affirming 
experience (Ring, 1993) that can happen at any time during the lifespan (Atwater, 2003). 
Although not all NDEs are pleasant journeys; some have been reported to be quite frightening 
(Greyson & Bush, 1992).  
 
Background to the Research 
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Before presenting any of the examples of IPA that we have used, it is necessary to give 
some context to the research that uncovered these findings.  
Previous survey research by the authors (Murray, Fox, & Wilde, 2006) investigated OBE 
incidence under five different circumstances; OBEs occurring spontaneously, whilst 
meditating, whilst ingesting alcohol or drugs (either for medicinal purposes or recreationally), 
whilst under perceived or real physical or psychological threat (but not near-death), and as 
part of a NDE. As part of that survey, OBErs supplied accounts of their OBEs. An analysis of 
those accounts directed the researchers to consider the OBE more broadly as a life-event 
when designing the study from which the following data extracts are culled.  
The study employed a qualitative approach using IPA. Fifteen participants were recruited 
corresponding to the five groups of OBE occurrence described above, with three participants 
in each group. The sample consisted of five males and ten females with an average age of 43 
years. Data was collected through the use of face-to-face, semi-structured interviews which 
lasted approximately one hour and were digitally audio-recorded and fully transcribed for 
analysis purposes.5 
The examples presented herein are excerpts taken from analysis of transcripts with 
participants who have experienced an OBE spontaneously, whilst meditating, or as part of an 
NDE. It is impossible to produce a full account here of all the research findings from these 
three groups. Instead, we present a selection of material that is illustrative of three themes 
that were common across many of the interviews.6 The themes illustrated here are: (1) Safe 
secrets and dirty truths: the art and practice of disclosing an anomalous experience; (2) Being, 
growing and ‘dying’: integrating an anomalous experience and the transformative effects on 
the self; and (3) The embodied nature of anomalous experiences. 
 
Safe Secrets and Dirty Truths: The Art and Practice of Disclosing an Anomalous Experience 
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This theme describes the efforts participants made to share their experiences with other 
people as part of an attempt to reach some understanding about them. However, most found 
that knowing when, where and with whom to disclose information about having had an OBE 
could be very challenging. For example, Mark and John reported having had spontaneous 
OBEs. Each had a strong wish to talk about their OBEs with other people but differed in their 
ability to fulfil this wish. Mark’s attempts at disclosure to his parents had met with some 
dismissiveness, particularly from his father. This experience had helped to galvanize a long-
term personal inhibition about talking further about his OBEs as illustrated in this extract:  
 
I think I made a mistake sometime by discussin’ in the workplace…People just tend to dismiss it 
an’ go, “What are y’on about?”…it’s probably because they’re not really interested…But like I 
say, I don’t think the workplace is the right place to discuss it…it’s quite a clumsy thing to do 
really. 
 
Mark’s use of the word ‘clumsy’ in this extract is reveals his perception of the awkward 
nature of his social encounters with people who did not believe his story. By contrast, John 
felt inhibited from the outset about discussing his experiences: 
 
It’s the sort of thing I would want to share, but I’d only tell select people that I could trust, they 
wouldn’t laugh at me and that sort of thing. 
 
In this extract, John reveals that he knows how his story might be perceived and is 
strategizing about how best to satisfy his need to share the experience with the perceived 
costs in terms of the reactions he may face in return. This tactic was observed in other 
interviewees. For example, Patricia–who had her OBEs whilst meditating–suspected that 
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others would not see her OBEs as authentic and seemed cautious about avoiding disbelief or 
ridicule: 
 
There’s no point really spoiling these experiences for myself ‘cos I didn’t want to have to sort of 
justify them or explain them…that might spoil my memory of them…I didn’t want them sort of 
dirtied in any way by people scoffing at them or laughing at them…so I thought, oh, well, best not 
really…it’s sort of better to keep it as a safe secret than a dirty truth or something. 
 
What is most revealing in this passage is the high value Patricia (and others we 
interviewed) placed on her OBEs. The experience and the memories of it are something to be 
treasured and protected. Also emergent in this passage is the notion that her OBEs would 
have to be justified or explained, suggesting that the experience would not be accessible or 
easily understood by other people. This is something Patricia is keen to avoid. Her OBEs are 
precious to her and she feels that having to defend them to others would ruin her memories of 
them and might even prevent her having more in the future. 
These perceptions raise important issues for how our society views anomalous 
experiences. Historically, OBEs have been discussed in connection with hallucinations (e.g. 
Blackmore, 1984) and mental illnesses (e.g. Rawciffe, 1959) with little direct evidence to 
perpetuate such assumptions. However, the perception of a mental disorder can lead to 
stigmatization and discrimination, personally, institutionally or structurally, or through social 
psychological processes which engage the perceptions of the person being stigmatized (e.g. 
schizophrenia Dinos, Stevens, Serfaty, Weich, & King, 2004). Whilst we found no accounts 
of direct discrimination, the views expressed above, particularly from Mark, do suggest 
encounters with others who perceived a person who has OBEs as having something ‘wrong’ 
with them. This can be further compounded depending upon the social context in which the 
disclosure is embedded. For example, earlier, we saw the difficulties Mark faced in disclosing 
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his OBEs in his workplace. Later in his interview he described how he received “negative 
feedback” with some people suggesting he had “made it up” or was “telling lies”. Similarly, 
Cindy–another respondent who had a spontaneous OBE–recalled the reactions she 
encountered from hospital staff when she told them of her experience: “they looked at you 
like…they thought I was mad”.   
These and other similar reactions have important implications for the identity of OBErs. 
Human beings are individuals immersed in a particular culture which is created and sustained 
publicly through language and communication, in particular through narrative and story-
telling. As Bruner (1990, pp.52-55) notes, “[narrative] deals with the stuff of human action 
and human intentionality. It mediates between the canonical world of culture and the more 
idiosyncratic world of beliefs, desires, and hopes...what, broadly, might be called the 
‘organization of experience’”. Although IPA’s main concerns are with individual experience, 
it also acknowledges that experience is bounded within culture and language, and in 
conducting IPA, the researcher inevitably hears the stories of participants in the process of 
‘organising’ their own experiences into a communicable, interpretable and understandable 
whole. With OBErs, this may be the first time they have had the chance to discuss in depth 
their OBEs (as John and Patricia revealed in their interviews). This can be somewhat 
‘therapeutic’ for the participant. The positive effects of successful sharing and disclosure of 
experiences such as OBEs have been acknowledged by Palmer and Braud (2002), who found 
that scores on measures of disclosure of Exceptional Human Experiences (EHEs) positively 
correlated with measures of personal and existential meaning in life and psychological well-




Being, Growing and ‘Dying’: Integrating an Anomalous Experience and the Transformative 
Effects on the Self 
The second theme we present relates to the impact our participants’ anomalous 
experiences had upon their sense of self, and is concerned with the potential for the 
experience to function as an adaptive form of behaviour. In this theme we will draw upon 
illustrations from interviews from one of our NDE participants.  
Jane was a married, twenty-something young woman who had few aspirations beyond 
settling down into a family way of life. During an operation in hospital for a burst stomach 
she had an NDE. Her NDE was characterized by very strong emotions; fear, anger, anxiety, 
isolation and remorse. These emotions were set against a background of several distinct 
motifs, the most powerful of which was Jane’s descent in to a dark and lonely void. Whilst in 
this place she reflected upon her life, her relationships with her friends and parents, and the 
times she had said and done bad things in her life. This motif was characterized by crushing 
feelings of inadequacy. Amidst this heavy, lonely feeling she heard a voice say to her, “don’t 
be too hard on yourself”, and at that point she returned to her body and awoke from the 
operation. Jane felt that the NDE changed her life and development as a human being 
considerably. As the days and weeks passed, she began to notice alterations in her beliefs and 
attitudes. These were underpinned by some major life changes as she found herself gradually 
becoming absorbed in developing herself personally and spiritually. As part of her sense-
making processes, interpersonal relationships became of primary importance to her: 
 
I ended up accepting myself for the person that I was…knowing that I was loved and 
loveable…I’ve never really succeeded because my, actually my friends were pretty screwed up 




Signs of the influence of Jane’s NDE began with a general feeling of having been exposed 
to information which necessitated a re-alignment of her personal beliefs and values about 
such issues as life after death, religion and her relationships with her friends/family and with 
God: 
 
It was such a big change for me because I suddenly had to think about my, what my beliefs were 
suddenly again. 
 
Jane perceived her NDE as a new beginning and was no longer afraid of dying. She 
confessed it was hard to say what influences could be attributed directly to the NDE, 
however, she did not think she would have become a counsellor without having had that 
experience. 
In considering IPA for a study of this kind, we wanted a method which would take 
seriously the experiential claims of the near-death experient and that would be sensitive 
enough to uncover the meaning the experients attribute to their NDE. As noted earlier, IPA 
concerns itself with addressing issues regarding changes in a person’s identity especially 
those associated with major life transitions (e.g. Smith, 1999). Corbett (1996) has proposed 
that the meaning of an event has a form of “dispositional power” over how a person will 
think and behave following that event. Findings from this study have shown that NDEs can 
be fruitfully regarded as critical life events (Dougherty, 1990) in terms of the transformation 
of person’s sense of self, identity, and their views towards relationships and general life 
directions. This ‘dispositional power’ of critical life events has been previously 
acknowledged by various authors (e.g. Baltes & Danish, 1980). 
 
The Embodied Nature of Anomalous Experiences 
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Embodiment has typically been a major consideration of phenomenology (e.g. Merleau-
Ponty, 1962). More recently, it has enjoyed a resurgence of interest from psychologists (e.g. 
Finlay & Langdridge, 2006). Yet, the importance and role of the body has remained relatively 
untouched in the field of anomalous experiences (but see Murray & Fox, 2005). In our third 
theme, we look briefly at embodiment issues in relation to OBEs occurring under meditative 
conditions. In particular, we examine how some participants described high degrees of 
control over their OBEs and viewed these experiences as learned, embodied skills.  
 Participants who had their OBEs whilst meditating displayed a strong desire for control, 
usually in relation to some form of unfulfilled needs in their lives. One of these participants, 
Patricia, revealed how her need for control manifested in both her personal and professional 
life. Patricia is a professional dancer and choreographer. Her mind and body are the tools of 
her trade. She explained early in the interview how she had used her OBEs to fulfil a need to 
overcome her fear of losing connection with loved ones and friends. Unexpectedly, she talked 
about how she appeared to have embodied her OBEs also; essentially viewing them as a tool 
she could use to help solve certain problems in her life. She elaborated on this, describing 
times when these emotions became too much for her leading to a strong desire to leave her 
body and an attempt to re-connect with those she missed: 
 
I remember…feeling really, really homesick, and sort of having a meditation…I think I was 
probably trying to get out of my body…and trying to get further and further away and trying [to] 
imagine where all my friends and family were…looking for people…like needing to find friends. 
 
Patricia also mentioned how her first OBEs had happened as a child and then stopped 
before reappearing again in adulthood: 
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For me it felt like something that I already knew how to do as a child, it was something that, that 
was quite familiar to me, it was like a skill I’d forgotten how to do, and this [the meditation] had 
helped remind me how to do it. 
 
The roots of her openness to experiencing OB states seem to have been founded in her 
childhood. When learning to meditate, she already had the cognitive skills from previous 
OBEs, and bodily knowledge from her dancing, to take advantage of the experience and use 
it as an extension of her self. This skill acquisition and development manifested in a great 
degree of control in entering and navigating the out-of-body environment: 
 
[Talking about onset sensations] The energy…the only way you can sort of do it is sort of through 
imagery really…it’s kind of like a…fountain or something, and it sort of goes up through layers, 
levels through your body, I’ve read stuff about chakras and stuff like that, I don’t necessarily 
believe it but I know what things feel like…it sort of goes through and up and into different levels 
and it sort of hits sort of target points and it can either stop or build up speed…if it comes out the 
top you really have no control over that, you can’t make it happen…if you imagine there’s like a 
push of water up and sort of bubbles at the top, well you’re sort of sat on the top…but it’s kind of 
coming from your own energy, really…whereas…with meditation you can almost track it, you’re 
a bit more in control of it somehow…[and later when in the out-of-body state]…I saw 
myself…seeing my room from above and then the red roof of my block of flats and the street 
outside…and seeing like the [town] outskirts…and sort of being able to say, ok, that must be 
Warsaw over there, that must be Krakow down there, that must be Berlin over there…ok that’s the 
Baltic, almost like being in an aircraft, I suppose…focusing in and going down and trying to sort 
of see streets and identify places where I used to live or where people would be. 
 
This last quote is a good example of the sizeable, thick description IPA interviews can 
yield. Several aspects of Patricia’s self emerge from these extracts. Phenomenologically 
speaking, Mauss (1950) as cited in Csordas (1993, p. 139) has underlined the function of 
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cognitive processes such as attention and imagination in the acquisition and perfection of 
physical skills (e.g. sports athletes). Csordas (ibid) coined the term “somatic modes of 
attention” and defined this as “culturally elaborated ways of attending to and with one's body 
in surroundings that include the embodied presence of others” (p. 138) that could be extended 
to altered states of consciousness, potentially invoked by meditation and OBEs.  
Bruner (1990) viewed the body as a biological assemblage of restraints and possibilities, 
the meanings of which are derived via an individual’s immersion with their cultural world. 
Whereas Husserl (1931) had previously described this relationship between consciousness 
and the world as ‘intentionality’, Merleau-Ponty (1962) preferred the term ‘body-subject’ to 
stress the intertwined nature of an individual’s physical and mental aspects of existence. For 
Merleau-Ponty, intentionality is the process by which “consciousness projects itself into the 
physical world and has a body, as it projects into a cultural world and has its habits” (1962, 
p.137). The term embodiment herein refers to the psychological sense of being in the physical 
body but also having the potential to transcend its physical limits. In the specific context of 
the data presented here, this term also refers to the linking of experiential episodes beyond the 
physical with the daily experience of being-in-the-world.7 
Patricia’s description of her progressive embodiment of her OBEs such that it becomes a 
skill is reminiscent of Merleau-Ponty’s (1962) concepts of ‘intentional arc’ and ‘maximum 
grip’. Merleau-Ponty suggested that intentionality starts from a position within the body and 
extends outward, engaging the world around it. In the process skills are acquired by 
interacting with objects and situations. This further leads to the concept of maximum grip–to 
achieve an increasingly superior grasp of lived situations. The cognitive skills depicted in 
Patricia’s account of her goal directed, way finding behaviour when out of her body are also 
evocative of Anderson’s (2003, p. 105) description of how a person cognitively navigates 
their environs.  
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The notion that the OBE could be a ‘tool’ in order to extend one’s sense of self (Hall, 
1969) and developed is consistent with the more pragmatic purposes sought in meditation 
(e.g. combating stress). That some people may be better at this than others suggests that this 
ability could be fruitfully viewed as idiosyncratic personality variable. Evidence from 
meditation research has found that a person’s ability to intentionally regulate their attention 
when meditating depended more on their in-built capacity for absorption than did the length 
of time they had been practicing the technique (Hoelzel & Ott, 2006). Additionally, 
Davidson, Goleman and Schwartz (1984) found that absorption was higher and anxiety lower 
in long-term meditators than it was in their beginner and control group members, suggesting 
a training effect with prolonged practice. Alvarado (2000) has suggested that one possible 
reason why people have multiple OBEs is that, after their first OBE, they become more 
skilful at identifying the onset of subsequent OBEs and thus develop greater cognitive 
abilities to aid the progression of the OBE when it starts. 
 
Conclusions 
In this paper we have argued for the use of Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis 
(IPA) as an approach for investigating anomalous experiences. In our considerations we have 
noted the relative lack of phenomenologically-based qualitative work that has been carried 
out so far in this field. In attempting to show the relevance of IPA to the study of anomalous 
experiences, we have highlighted how the robust, broad ranging theoretical and philosophical 
underpinnings of the approach compliment certain key issues of anomalistic experiential 
research.  We have also emphasized the idiographic nature of the approach, which focuses on 
the meaning and impact such experiences can have on people and the meanings and 
interpretations experients apportion to their experiences.  
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The findings generated from such work are likely to be of great interest to professionals, 
participants and the general public alike (Braud, 2004). For example, the idiographic, 
phenomenological approach taken in this research has highlighted the subtle affective, social 
and psychological mediating factors that influenced how the OB/NDE was interpreted and 
integrated during the course of daily life living. In order to more thoroughly understand the 
impact of these experiences it is important to consider how they fit within the biographical 
context of a person’s life. In so doing, this approach has shown how concomitant physical 
and psychological events can interweave with an anomalous experience in multifarious ways. 
This in turn may assist or hinder how a person gets to the underlying meaning of their 
experience.  
Our participants’ initial OB/NDEs were unforeseen events. However, once they had 
occurred, they became fundamental constituents of their evolving self identities. Using IPA, 
we have been able to describe how participants initially cognitively appraised and then 
redefined their OB/NDEs, which involved moving from a period of initial confusion as to the 
causality of their experiences to later framing them as positive life-affirming occurrences. 
Participants then began a process of actively seeking out further information and support, and 
then, in some instances, they acted upon that information to try to further understand and 
bring meaning to their experiences. Related to this were the challenges our participant’s faced 
in attempting to share their anomalous experiences with others and the various strategies they 
employed to manage this disclosure. 
Furthermore, in keeping with its applied nature, by examining the experience and meaning 
of these life events, such research findings can better furnish psychologists and health care 
professionals to understand their clients’ experiences and to help them with any potential 





1 It is beyond the scope of this paper to consider this debate in any detail, but the interested reader may wish to 
consult Irwin and Watt (2007a) and Henry (2005) as useful starting guides to this discussion. 
2Braud (2004) has criticised the use of the term “anomalous” as it may imply that a given experience may not be 
normal or natural, perhaps even automatically suggesting a pathology, i.e. abnormal. The authors would like to 
stress that our conception of “anomalous” is simply as a term referring to experiences that are infrequent and 
unusual, without any predilection to pathologising the experient. In our understanding, experients often report 
how normal their experiences feel to them and emphasize their positive, life-affirming aspects (Wilde & 
Murray, 2009). 
3Synchronicity: “[A] coincidence that is acausal, wherein certain events do not seem to be connected by normal 
causal means, and that is also particularly meaningful to the experiencer” (Hanson & Klimo, 1998, p.281) 
4Channeling: A phenomenon in which “a person purports to transmit information or messages directly from a 
personality or consciousness other than his or her own, usually through automatic writing or trance speaking; 
this other personality usually claims to be a nonphysical spirit or being”  (Hastings, 1990, p. 99). 
5
A small sample size in a study will usually raise questions about the generalisability of the findings to wider 
populations. Whilst IPA is not opposed to more general claims for larger populations, it is “committed to the 
painstaking analysis of cases rather than jumping to generalizations” (Smith & Osborn, 2008, p. 54). Although 
generalisable claims regarding a sample in a single IPA study are not made, as more studies with other samples 
are carried out with similar findings, more general claims become possible. Smith and Osborn (ibid) refer to this 
as 'theoretical generalisability', rather than 'empirical generalisability'. While we do not make any claims that the 
experiences described herein are universal to all OB/NDEs or OB/NDErs, we have explicated the meanings of 
the OB/NDE which emerged for our participants. 
6
Further themes extracted from the analysis of the data so far are currently in various stages of publication. A 
paper discussing the findings of the NDE group has been published (Wilde & Murray, 2009). A second paper, 
focusing on the spontaneous group findings, Wilde & Murray, “The experience and management of anomalous 
experience: An Examination of the Out-of-Body Experience Using Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis”, 
is currently under review for Psychology and Psychotherapy: Theory, Research and Practice. A third paper 
based on the meditative group findings, Wilde & Murray, “An Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis of 
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Out-of-Body Experiences in Two Cases of Novice Meditators”, has been submitted to the Australian Journal of 
Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis.  
7
The brief discussion about embodiment herein naturally raises questions about the veridicality of OBEs. This is 
a hotly debated topic in psychology and parapsychology and one which currently resists explanation. What we 
are more interested in here is the interrelated role the body and the sense of being-in-the-world plays in our 
participants OBEs. The accounts of OBEs often contain reported content of altered perceptions that cannot be 
readily explained by the everyday functioning of a person’s usual six senses–at least as is understood by 
classical philosophy. OBErs appear to have different perceptions regarding their body boundaries, which require 
further exploration and explanation. Studies in other fields investigating embodiment issues in people with 
disrupted body boundaries, for example, people with disabilities (see Murray and Sixsmith, 1999), have shown 
that, for some at people at least, the body boundary does not ‘stop’ at the skin surface, but is in fact much more 
acquiescent. Furthermore, as Langer (1989) notes, research has shown how the experience of a phantom limb is 
inextricably linked with the personal history of the experient, such that the limb can ‘appear’ when the experient 
reminisces about the time when the limb was lost, thus completing the intentional arc between the body-subject 
and the world. 
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